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In reasoning about actions, it is commonly assumed that the dynamics of domains
satisﬁes the Markov Property: the executability conditions and the effects of all actions
are fully determined by the present state of the system. This is true in particular in
Reiter’s Basic Action Theories in the Situation Calculus. In this paper, we generalize
Basic Action Theories by removing the Markov property restriction, making it possible
to directly axiomatize actions whose effects and executability conditions may depend on
past and even alternative, hypothetical situations. We then generalize Reiter’s regression
operator, which is the main computational mechanism used for reasoning with Basic Action
Theories, so that it can be used with non-Markovian theories.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Since the 1960’s when John McCarthy’s papers (in particular the 1969 paper with Pat Hayes) appeared introducing the
Situation Calculus, researchers have been studying and working on this language for reasoning about dynamic domains. The
Situation Calculus, one of John’s many great inventions, is the topic of this paper and I am delighted to have this opportunity
to make a contribution to a special issue in John’s honor.
1. Introduction
An assumption commonly made in formalisms for reasoning about the effects of actions is the so called Markov property:
the executability of an action and its effects are entirely determined by the current state or situation. In particular, Reiter’s
Basic Action Theories [2], a Situation Calculus [3,4] based axiomatization, deﬁne the value of a ﬂuent after the execution
of an action in terms of a formula that can only talk about the situation in which the action would be executed. The
preconditions of an action are speciﬁed by formulas with the same restriction. In this paper we generalize Basic Action
Theories by removing this restriction. The generalized theories will allow the executability conditions and the effects of an
action to depend not only on what holds when the action is to occur, but also on whether certain conditions were satisﬁed
at different points in the past and even alternative hypothetical evolutions of the system.
As an example, imagine a robot that works in a biological research facility with different safety-level areas. The dynamics
is such that a material will be considered contaminated after the robot touches it if the robot has been to a low safety area
or has directly been in contact with a hazardous material, and has not been to the disinfection station since then. So the
effect of touching the material depends on the history of robot activities. We could also imagine that the robot cannot
execute the action open(Entrance, Lab1) if temp(Lab1) > 30 was ever true since the last time closed(Entrance, Lab1) occurred.
The latter is an example of an action with non-Markovian preconditions.
In simple scenarios, it is not diﬃcult to extend a theory to preserve the necessary history by means of new state
variables, especially when the domain is ﬁnite. But in complex domains it may not be obvious how to do it, and the
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describing their dynamics.
Our goal in this paper is to generalize Reiter’s Basic Action Theories [5,2] by removing the Markov property requirement
and generalize the main reasoning mechanism used with these theories, namely the regression operator R, so that it
can be used with non-Markovian theories, and applied to Situation Calculus formulas that refer to the past, to alternative
evolutions, and to deﬁnite future situations.
This generalized regression operator is not only useful in cases where the action theory is non-Markovian. Even if the
background theory is Markovian, the operator is useful for answering queries that refer to past situations through quan-
tiﬁcation and the subsequence relation . This is not possible with Reiter’s original regression operator. In [2, Section 4.8],
Reiter presents a few specialized procedures for evaluating certain historical queries with respect to a database log (a se-
quence of ground action terms) and a Markovian action theory. Those queries are a very small subset of the class of queries
that the generalized regression operator we present here can handle.
Our work is relevant to a variety of research problems that involve the formalization of dynamic properties:
(1) Some work in database theory has been concerned with the semantics of dynamic integrity constraints [6,7]. These
constraints are typically expressed in Past Linear Temporal Logic, a logic with temporal connectives Previous, Sometime
in the past, Always in the past, and Since. In a formalization of a database system in the Situation Calculus, such
temporal connectives amount to references to past situations, and the constraints to restrictions on when a sequence of
actions can be considered a “legal” database system evolution. These past temporal logic connectives have an encoding
as formulas in the non-Markovian Situation Calculus and hence the latter can be used as a logical framework for
the study, speciﬁcation and modeling of databases with dynamic integrity constraints. The advantage of carrying out
such work in this framework is that all the different aspects of the problem, i.e. database dynamics, transactions and
constraints, can be captured within the same Situation Calculus framework.
(2) Also in the area of databases, more speciﬁcally in work on database transaction systems, the rollback operation, which
reverts a database back to its original state after a long transaction fails or is canceled, clearly has a non-Markovian
ﬂavor: its effects depend not on what is true in the state it is executed, but on the state right before the transaction
being reversed started. Indeed, Kiringa [8] and Kiringa and Gabaldon [9,10] present logical speciﬁcations of database
transactions in the non-Markovian Situation Calculus.
(3) In planning, domain dependent knowledge for search control has been used with great success [11,12]. Bacchus and
Kabanza’s forward-chaining planning system, TLPlan, uses search control knowledge in the form of temporal logic for-
mulas. The same approach has been applied in the Situation Calculus with some simple planners written in Golog [2].
The latter planners perform a forward search, eliminating partial plans if they lead to “bad situations.” Search control
knowledge is encoded through a predicate badSituation(s) whose deﬁnition is restricted to properties of the current
situation s. The generalization of the action theories and the regression operator we shall develop here allows the def-
inition of this predicate to refer to any situation that precedes s and bounded future situations. As we mention above,
past temporal logic expressions can be encoded as Situation Calculus formulas suitable for regression with our gen-
eralized operator and be used in the deﬁnition of badSituation(s). In other words, the generalized regression operator
allows one to use temporal search control knowledge of a similar form and expressive power as used in TLPlan directly
in Golog planners with the badSituation(s) predicate. Search control knowledge in this context is further explored in
our recent work [13,14].
(4) Another area where non-Markovian features arise naturally is in specifying reward functions in decision theoretic plan-
ning. There, agents are often rewarded based on their long-term behavior rather than just on the current state of affairs.
Bacchus, Boutilier and Grove [15,16] have developed techniques for solving such non-Markovian Decision Processes.
More recent work on non-Markovian rewards appears in [17,18].
(5) Finally, some time ago John McCarthy [19] described a programming language called “Elephant 2000” which, among
other features, “does not forget.” This is a language that would allow one to write programs that explicitly and directly
refer to past states of the programming environment. The generalized regression operator we present here could form
the foundation for a non-forgetting Golog [20]. Such a dialect of Golog would allow test conditions that refer to the
past, for instance, as in the statement if (P since Q ) then δ.
This paper is organized as follows: we start in Section 2 with an overview of the Situation Calculus and Reiter’s Basic
Action Theories. In Section 3 we introduce a class of Situation Calculus formulas that can refer to past and ﬁnite future
situations and can be regressed, and based on this, our generalization of action theories for non-Markovian control. In
Section 4 we present a regression operator that works for those formulas and theories and prove its correctness, followed
by a Prolog implementation in Section 5 and our concluding remarks in Section 6.
2. Overview of the Situation Calculus and Basic Action Theories
The Situation Calculus [3,4] is a dialect of classical logic for representing and reasoning about dynamically changing
worlds. A theory in this language consists of a collection of axioms describing how the world changes when actions occur.
Accordingly, the ontology of the Situation Calculus includes three main ingredients: actions, situations, and ﬂuents. Situ-
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occurred in such a history. Fluents are the properties of the world that change over time.
Since McCarthy introduced it, the Situation Calculus has been adopted in various languages and differing axiomatizations.
In this paper we use the version described in [5,21,2], whose formal deﬁnition we review next.
2.1. Situation Calculus
The Situation Calculus (as we will refer to this version from now on), denoted by Lsitcalc , is a second-order language
with equality and with three disjoint sorts called action, situation and object. In addition to standard logical symbols, its
vocabulary includes:
• A countably inﬁnite number of variable symbols of each sort and predicate variables of all arities.
• The constant symbol S0, of sort situation, which is used to represent the initial situation of the world, before any action
occurs.
• The function symbol do of sort action× situation → situation, which is used to form sequences of actions. A term do(a, s)
represents the situation after action a is executed in situation s.
• The binary predicate symbol , used to represent an ordering relation on situations. Intuitively, s  s′ means that
situation s precedes s′ , or, in terms of sequences of actions, that s is a proper preﬁx of the sequence of actions s′ .
• The binary predicate symbol Poss : action × situation. The intuitive meaning of Poss(a, s) is that in situation s, it is
possible to execute action a.
• For each n  0, a ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite number of function symbols of sort (action ∪ object)n → action called
action functions. For example: move(A, B) and write(agent3,nextChapter(Thesis, s)). We will sometimes refer to an action
function as an action type, since each action function can have many instances.
• For each n  0, a ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite number of predicate symbols of sort (action ∪ object)n × situation called
relational ﬂuents, and a countably inﬁnite number of function symbols of sort (action ∪ object)n × situation → action ∪
object called functional ﬂuents. For example,
on
(
A, B,do
(
move(A, B), S0
))
.
• For each n  0, a ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite number of n-ary predicates and functions without a situation argument
which are used for expressing situation independent relations, i.e. properties of the world that do not change as a result
of actions. For example: distance(csDept,mathDept).
The following four Foundational Axioms, denoted by Σ , characterize situations and the precedence relation :
do(a1, s1) = do(a2, s2) ⊃ a1 = a2 ∧ s1 = s2, (1)
(∀P ).P (S0) ∧ (∀a, s)
[
P (s) ⊃ P(do(a, s))] ⊃ (∀s)P (s), (2)
¬s S0, (3)
s do(a, s′) ≡ s s′ ∨ s = s′. (4)
Axiom (1) is a unique names axiom for the function do, and it captures the intuition that different histories (sequences of
actions) are different situations. Axiom (2) deﬁnes how situations are built using the function do. This deﬁnition is inductive
and so this axiom is second-order. Axiom (3) stipulates that S0 has no preceding situations, thus capturing the intuition
that it is the initial situation, and together with axiom (4) and the induction axiom it deﬁnes the precedence relation .
2.2. Basic Action Theories
The foundational axioms Σ are the domain independent part of a Situation Calculus axiomatization of a dynamic world.
The domain dependent part consists of: a set of axioms describing the initial state of the world, a set of axioms describing
the conditions under which actions are executable and another set of axioms describing how each of the ﬂuents changes
when actions occur. The notion of a uniform formula is useful in describing these axioms.
Deﬁnition 1 (Uniform formulas). Let σ be a term of sort situation. The Lsitcalc terms uniform in σ are inductively deﬁned as
the smallest set of terms such that:
(1) Any term that does not mention a term of sort situation is uniform in σ .
(2) If g is an n-ary non-ﬂuent function symbol, and t1, . . . , tn are terms that are uniform in σ and whose sorts are appro-
priate for g , then g(t1, . . . , tn) is uniform in σ .
(3) If f is an (n + 1)-ary functional ﬂuent symbol, and t1, . . . , tn are terms that are uniform in σ and whose sorts are
appropriate for f , then f (t1, . . . , tn, σ ) is uniform in σ .
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(1) Any formula that does not mention a term of sort situation is uniform in σ .
(2) When F is an (n+1)-ary relational ﬂuent and t1, . . . , tn are terms uniform in σ whose sorts are appropriate for F , then
F (t1, . . . , tn, σ ) is a formula uniform in σ .
(3) If U1 and U2 are formulas uniform in σ , then so are ¬U1, U1 ∧ U2 and (∃v)U1 provided v is a variable not of sort
situation.
For each action type A(x),1 a dynamic world axiomatization includes an axiom deﬁning when such an action is exe-
cutable. These axioms deﬁne the relation Poss(a, s):
Deﬁnition 2 (Action precondition axiom). An action precondition axiom is a sentence of the form:
Poss
(
A(x1, . . . , xn), s
) ≡ ΠA(x1, . . . , xn, s),
where A is an n-ary action function symbol and ΠA(x1, . . . , xn, s) is a formula with free variables among x1, . . . , xn, s that
is uniform in s.
For each ﬂuent, relational or functional, an axiom deﬁning the ﬂuent’s value after the execution of an action is included
in the dynamic world axiomatization:
Deﬁnition 3 (Successor state axioms). A successor state axiom for an (n+ 1)-ary relational ﬂuent F is a sentence of the form:
F
(
x1, . . . , xn,do(a, s)
) ≡ ΦF (x1, . . . , xn,a, s),
where ΦF (x1, . . . , xn,a, s) is a formula with free variables among x1, . . . , xn,a, s that is uniform in s.
A successor state axiom for an (n+ 1)-ary functional ﬂuent f is a sentence of the form:
f
(
x1, . . . , xn,do(a, s)
) = y ≡ φ f (x1, . . . , xn, y,a, s),
where φ f (x1, . . . , xn, y,a, s) is a formula with free variables among x1, . . . , xn, y, a, s that is uniform in s.
The right-hand sides of action precondition and successor state axioms are required to be uniform in situation variable s.
This is exactly how the Markov property is enforced in these theories. Intuitively, the executability conditions of an action
and the value of ﬂuents in a successor situation can only be deﬁned in terms of the current situation.
A collection of axioms of the above forms is known as a Basic Action Theory:
Deﬁnition 4 (Basic Action Theories). An Lsitcalc Basic Action Theory, D, is a collection of axioms D = Σ ∪Dss ∪Dap ∪Duna ∪DS0
where:
• Σ are the foundational axioms (1)–(4).
• Dss is a set of successor state axioms, one for each ﬂuent.
• Dap is a set of action precondition axioms, one for each action type.
• Duna is a set of unique name axioms for actions, such as: pickup(x) = putdown(y) and stack(x, y) = stack(x′, y′) ⊃ x =
x′ ∧ y = y′ .
• DS0 is a set of ﬁrst order sentences that are uniform in S0. These axioms describe the initial state of the world and are
sometimes referred to as the initial database.
3. Non-Markovian theories
In this section we introduce Non-Markovian Basic Action Theories. In Markovian action theories, the Markov assumption
is realized by requiring that the formulas in the action precondition axioms and successor state axioms refer only to one sit-
uation, a variable s, which is prenex universally quantiﬁed in the axioms. In non-Markovian action theories, situation terms
other than s will be allowed under the restriction that they refer to the past or to an alternative, explicitly bounded evolu-
tion. To make this formal, we need to introduce the notion of situation-bounded formulas. Intuitively, an Lsitcalc formula is
bounded by a situation term σ if all the situation variables it mentions are restricted, through equality or the  predicate,
to range over subsequences of σ . This notion is useful because in order to apply regression to a formula, one needs to know
how many actions there are in each situation, i.e., how many regression steps to apply. A formula that mentions a situation
variable can be regressed provided that the variable is restricted to be a subsequence of some situation term with a known
number of actions in it. This intuitions are made precise below.
1 t denotes a tuple of terms t1, . . . , tn .
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that (a) any quantiﬁed situation variable s in the formula is restricted to range over situations between S0 and σ (it must fall on the solid line, as depicted)
and (b) any successor situation of s mentioned in the formula, say σ ′′ , must explicitly enumerate the actions that occur after s, i.e., σ ′′ must be rooted
at s. The formula may in turn have a subformula bounded by a situation term rooted at s, say σ ′′ , which may quantify over variables as long as they fall
on the solid line from S0 to σ ′′ , and so on. A formula bounded by σ can be regressed because it is possible to determine the length of all its situation
terms during the regression. For example, if we choose a value for s, we will know its length because we know the length of σ , and we will then know
the length of σ ′′ as well. On the other hand, the formula (∃s∗)σ ′  s∗ ∧ F (s∗), for example, with a situation variable ranging over the situations on the
dotted branches, cannot be regressed since it is not possible to put a bound on the length of s∗ .
The following notation is used throughout: for n 0, we write do([α1, . . . ,αn],ρ) to denote the term do(αn,do(αn−1, . . . ,
do(α1,ρ) . . .)) of sort situation, where α1, . . . ,αn are terms of sort action and ρ stands for a variable s of sort situation or
the constant S0. For such a situation term, we will refer to ρ as the root of the term. If n = 0, do([α1, . . . ,αn],ρ) stands for
the root ρ . Also, for each i = 1, . . . ,n, we say that the term do([α1, . . . ,αi],ρ) is a preﬁx of do([α1, . . . ,αn],ρ). If i < n then
we say it is a proper preﬁx. For any term do([α1, . . . ,αn],ρ), n 0, we say n is the length of the term.
Deﬁnition 5 (Rooted situation terms). For n  0, let α1, . . . ,αn be terms of sort action. A term do([α1, . . . ,αn], s) is rooted at
s iff s is the only (if any) variable of sort situation mentioned by α1, . . . ,αn . A term do([α1, . . . ,αn], S0) is rooted at S0 iff
α1, . . . ,αn mention no variables of sort situation.
Recall that action functions may take terms of sorts object and action as arguments and that the language includes
functional ﬂuents, which may appear in these terms. For instance, do(A( f (do(B, s′))), s) is a perfectly legal situation term.
Notice that according to the above deﬁnition, this term is not rooted. The reason is that s is not the only variable the term
mentions, there is also s′ in the functional ﬂuent term f (B, s′).
Next, we introduce the related notion of uniformly rooted formulas. These formulas have situation terms with a common
root and thus, intuitively, their truth value is relativized to such a root.
Deﬁnition 6 (Uniformly rooted formulas). Let ρ be the constant S0 or a variable of sort situation. The Lsitcalc formulas uniformly
rooted at ρ are inductively deﬁned as follows:
(1) If σ1, σ2 are terms of sort situation rooted at ρ , then σ1  σ2 is uniformly rooted at ρ;
(2) If t1, t2 are terms of any sort all of whose subterms of sort situation are rooted at ρ , then t1 = t2 is uniformly rooted
at ρ;
(3) If W is a formula that does not mention terms of sort situation, then W is uniformly rooted at ρ;
(4) If F (t1, . . . , tn, σ ) is a relational ﬂuent atom, all terms of sort situation mentioned by t1, . . . , tn are rooted at ρ and σ is
rooted at ρ , then F (t1, . . . , tn, σ ) is a formula uniformly rooted at ρ;
(5) If W1,W2 are formulas uniformly rooted at ρ , then so are ¬W1, W1 ∧ W2 and (∃v)W1 provided v is different than ρ .
3.1. Bounded and strictly bounded formulas
We deﬁne next the class of bounded and strictly bounded formulas of Lsitcalc upon which Non-Markovian Basic Action
Theories will be based. The following abbreviations will be very useful for writing this kind of formulas:
(∃s: σ ′  σ ′′  σ )W def= (∃s)[σ ′  σ ′′ ∧ σ ′′  σ ∧ W ],
(∀s: σ ′  σ ′′  σ )W def= (∀s)[(σ ′  σ ′′ ∧ σ ′′  σ ) ⊃ W ]. (5)
Here, σ ′′ is rooted at s. Any  may be replaced by  or =. We will sometimes write (∃s: σ ′′  σ)W as a shorthand for
(∃s: S0  σ ′′  σ)W ((∀s)S0  s is a logical consequence of the foundational axioms Σ ).
The regression operator as deﬁned in [5,21] requires all terms of sort situation to be of the form do(α, S0). Intuitively,
this allows determining how many iterations are required in order to regress a formula into one relative to S0 only. Our
goal is to generalize regression for formulas that refer to situations through quantiﬁed variables. Since it is not possible
to regress formulas with variables that refer to arbitrary situations, e.g. (∃s)F (s), we deﬁne a class of regressable formulas
based on the notion of bounded formulas, which we introduce below. Quantiﬁed situation variables are restricted in these
formulas in such a way that the number of regression steps remains bounded. Fig. 1 explains the intuition behind them.
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Deﬁnition 7 (Bounded formulas). Let ρ be a situation variable or the constant S0. The formulas of Lsitcalc bounded by a
situation term rooted at ρ are the smallest set of formulas such that:
(1) If W is an atom uniformly rooted at ρ , then W is bounded by a situation term rooted at ρ .
(2) If
(a) W is a propositional combination of formulas each bounded by a situation term rooted at s or at ρ ,
(b) σ ′ does not mention variable s,
(c) σ ′′ is rooted at s,
(d) σ is rooted at ρ ,
then2 (∃s: σ ′  σ ′′  σ)W is a formula bounded by a situation term rooted at ρ .
(3) If W1,W2 are formulas bounded by situation terms rooted at ρ , then ¬W1, W1 ∧ W2 and (∃v)W1, where v is of sort
action or object, are formulas bounded by a situation term rooted at ρ .
In the deﬁnition of bounded formulas above, no particular situation term σ is deﬁned as the bound of a formula. We
only say that a formula is bounded by “a situation term rooted at ρ .” The reason for this is that the situation terms are
not what is important, but the root ρ is. Indeed, in the last item of the deﬁnition, W1,W2 may have no situation term in
common other than ρ . But if each is bounded by a term rooted at ρ , that is enough to guarantee that the combination
be bounded by a term rooted at ρ . Throughout the paper, we will often talk about a formula being bounded by a speciﬁc
term σ , usually one that occurs in the formula.
The following example attempts to illustrate these deﬁnitions.
Example 1. Suppose that σ denotes the following situation term:
do
([get_coffee,deliver_coffee,gotoMailRm], S0
)
and consider the sentence:
(∃a)(∃s: S0  do(a, s) σ )batteryCharged(do(chargeBatt, s)).
Intuitively, this sentence says that there is a situation s strictly preceding σ , after which some action a occurs, and in
which action chargeBatt would have successfully charged the battery. This sentence is bounded by a term rooted at S0,
in particular by σ . Indeed, all situation variables mentioned by it are restricted to range over subsequences of σ . The
subformula
batteryCharged
(
do(chargeBatt, s)
)
is in turn bounded by a term rooted at s, do(chargeBatt, s). The existentially quantiﬁed variable s ranges over the subse-
quences of do(get_coffee, S0). Notice that the subformula refers to the situation do(chargeBatt, s) which is not a preﬁx of σ .
See Fig. 2 for a depiction of the situation tree of this example.
In the above example, we showed that bounded formulas may refer to situations that do not directly lie on the bounding
sequence of actions. This allows reasoning about what would have held if the evolution of the world had diverted in a
2 As before, any  may be replaced by  or =.
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different direction starting from some past point. Another class of formulas with a further restriction will be useful later
for deﬁning Non-Markovian Basic Action Theories. Formulas in this class are only allowed to refer to situations that are
predecessors of the bounding situation. In terms of Fig. 1, situation variables would be restricted to the situations between
s and σ . They would not be allowed to deviate from this line as does σ ′′ in that ﬁgure. Formally, we introduce a strict
version of boundedness below.
Deﬁnition 8 (Simple situation terms). A situation term do([α1, . . . ,αn], s) is simple iff all the terms of sort situation mentioned
by α1, . . . ,αn are preﬁxes of do([α1, . . . ,αn], s).
Clearly, simple situation terms are rooted. The situation term
do
(
A
(
f
(
do(B, s)
))
, s
)
is rooted but not simple since do(B, s) is not a preﬁx of it. The term
do
(
A
(
f (s)
)
, s
)
is simple.
Deﬁnition 9 (Strictly bounded formulas). Let σ be a simple situation term. The formulas of Lsitcalc strictly bounded by σ are
the smallest set of formulas such that:
(1) If W is an atom whose terms of sort situation are all preﬁxes of σ , then W is strictly bounded by σ .
(2) If
(a) σ ′ is a simple situation term that does not mention variable s,
(b) σ ′′ is a simple situation term rooted at s, and
(c) W is a propositional combination of formulas each strictly bounded by σ ′′ or by σ ,
then3 (∃s: σ ′  σ ′′  σ)W is a formula strictly bounded by σ .
(3) If W1,W2 are formulas strictly bounded by σ , then ¬W1, W1 ∧ W2 and (∃v)W1, where v is of sort action or object,
are formulas strictly bounded by σ .
Clearly, the formula from Example 1, whose possible situation instances are shown in Fig. 2, is not a strictly bounded
formula. If we replace the situation term do(chargeBatt, s) in that formula with do(a, s) we obtain the following formula
which is strictly bounded:
(∃a)(∃s: S0  do(a, s) σ )batteryCharged(do(a, s)).
The following example shows that strictly bounded formulas are expressive enough to encode Past Linear Temporal Logic
modalities.
Example 2. In the Situation Calculus, referring to the past means referring to past situations. In this sense, one can write
formulas that capture the intuitive meaning of the past linear temporal logic connectives S (since),
← (sometime in the
past),
← (always in the past), and ←−! (previous) as follows (the ϕ ’s below denote Situation Calculus formulas with a single
free variable of sort situation that has been suppressed. ϕ[s] denotes a situation suppressed formula with a variable s
reinstated):
(ϕ1 S ϕ2)[s] def=
(∃s′: s′  s){ϕ2[s′] ∧ (∀s′′: s′  s′′  s)ϕ1[s′′]},
3 Any  may be replaced by  or =.
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(← ϕ)[s] def= (∀s′: s′  s)ϕ[s′],
(←−
!ϕ
)[s] def= (∃a)(∃s′: do(a, s′) = s)ϕ[s′].
It is easy to see that the above formulas are strictly bounded.
3.2. Non-Markovian Basic Action Theories
We are now ready to deﬁne action precondition axioms and successor state axioms for Non-Markovian Basic Action
Theories.
Deﬁnition 10 (Action precondition axioms). An action precondition axiom is a sentence of the form:
Poss
(
A(x1, . . . , xn), s
) ≡ ΠA(x1, . . . , xn, s),
where A is an n-ary action function symbol and ΠA(x1, . . . , xn, s) is a ﬁrst order formula with free variables among
x1, . . . , xn, s that is bounded by a situation term rooted at s and does not mention the predicate symbol Poss.
Example 3. Suppose that a robot works in a lab where there is a door that must not be opened if the temperature inside
reached some dangerous level d after it was closed. The robot’s theory would include a precondition axiom:
Poss
(
open(Door), s
) ≡(∃s1: S0  do
(
close(Door), s1
)  s).(∀a, s2 : s1  do(a, s2)  s)a = open(Door)∧
(∀s2: s1  s2  s)temp(Door, s2) < d.
Using the above temporal logic abbreviations plus the abbreviation occ(a)[s] def= (∃s′)do(a, s′) = s we can put this formula
in the following more readable form:
Poss
(
open(Door), s
) ≡ (¬occ(open(Door)) ∧ temp(Door) < d) S occ(close(Door))[s].
The rhs of action precondition axioms is not required to be strictly bounded but only bounded, which allows referring to
situations branching away into “hypothetical futures.” For instance, the above axiom could include a condition saying that
after the robot does open(Door) it should not be possible for a human or robot to do something to get the human hurt:
Poss(open(Door), s) ≡ · · · ∧ ¬(∃a)hurt(person,do(a,do(open(Door), s))).
Deﬁnition 11 (Successor state axioms). A successor state axiom for an (n+ 1)-ary relational ﬂuent F is a sentence of the form:
F
(
x1, . . . , xn,do(a, s)
) ≡ ΦF (x1, . . . , xn,a, s),
where ΦF (x1, . . . , xn,a, s) is a ﬁrst order formula with free variables among x1, . . . , xn,a, s that is strictly bounded by s and
does not mention the constant S0 nor the predicate symbol Poss.
A successor state axiom for an (n+ 1)-ary functional ﬂuent f is a sentence of the form:
f
(
x1, . . . , xn,do(a, s)
) = y ≡ φ f (x1, . . . , xn, y,a, s),
where φ f (x1, . . . , xn, y,a, s) is a ﬁrst order formula with free variables among x1, . . . , xn, y,a, s that is strictly bounded by s
and does not mention the constant S0 nor the predicate symbol Poss.
The requirement that S0 not appear in the rhs of successor state axioms is a technical detail introduced to simplify the
proofs and is not essential (after all, it is variables, not S0, which can cause trouble and require restrictions through notions
like bounded formulas). Moreover, it is still possible to express conditions on the initial situation by referring to it indirectly.
For instance, a condition that P hold initially can be expressed as (∃s1: s1  s){P (s1) ∧ ¬(∃s2: s2  s1)True}.
On the other hand, the condition that the rhs of successor state axioms be strictly bounded cannot be relaxed. Bounded
but not strictly bounded formulas can cause regression to fail. Consider the following successor state axioms:
P
(
do(a, s)
) ≡ (∃s′: s′  s)Q (do([B1, B2, B3], s′)),
Q
(
do(a, s)
) ≡ (∃s′: s′  s)P(do([C1,C2,C3], s′)).
Applying a few steps of regression to the atom P (do([A1, A2], S0)), for instance, results in the atom Q (do([B1, B2, B3],
S0)) and this in turn is regressed into
P
(
do
([B1,C1,C2,C3], S0
)) ∨ P(do([C1,C2,C3], S0
))
.
Clearly, regression is not working here since the situation terms will continue to lengthen. For action precondition axioms
this problem does not occur because the predicate Poss is not allowed to appear on the rhs of these axioms.
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be:
polluted
(
mat,do(a, s)
) ≡ polluted(mat, s)∨
a = touch(mat) ∧ (∃loc).safetyLevel(loc, Low)∧(¬atLoc(DisinfSt) S atLoc(loc))[s].
Deﬁnition 12 (Non-Markovian Basic Action Theories). A Non-Markovian Basic Action Theory D is a theory of Lsitcalc consisting
of the following set of axioms:
• The foundational axioms Σ .
• A set of successor state axioms Dss as in Deﬁnition 10.
• A set of action precondition axioms Dap as in Deﬁnition 11.
• A set of unique names axioms for actions Duna .
• A set of ﬁrst order sentences DS0 that mention no situation terms other than S0 and represent the initial state of the
world.
3.3. Two relativity properties
Intuitively, a strictly bounded formula has the property that its truth value depends only on the past relative to the
situation that is the bound, i.e., its truth value depends only on the truth value of ﬂuents throughout such a situation
(history) and on situation independent predicates and functions. The following theorem conﬁrms this intuition.
Theorem 1. Let S, S ′ be structures of Lsitcalc with the same domain Act for sort action, Obj for sort object and Sit for sort situation, and
let v be a variable assignment ranging over these domains. Furthermore, let φ be an Lsitcalc formula that is strictly bounded by σ , does
not mention Poss, and whose only free variable of sort situation, if any, is the root of σ . If
(1) S and S ′ satisfy the foundational axioms Σ ;
(2) S ′ is the same;
(3) the interpretation of all action functions and situation independent functions and predicates in S and S ′ is the same;
(4) for each relational ﬂuent F (x, s′), if S, v | (s′  σ) then
S, v | F (x, s′) iff S ′, v | F (x, s′);
(5) for each functional ﬂuent f (x, s′), if S, v | (s′  σ) then4
f S
(
v(x), v(s′)) = f S ′(v(x), v(s′))
then
S, v | φ iff S ′, v | φ.
Intuitively, conditions (1)–(3) make sure the structures S, S ′ coincide on the interpretation of the tree of situations and
the situation independent part of the language. Then conditions (4) and (5) require S, S ′ to coincide on the value of all
ﬂuents at situations preceding σ . Then, according to the theorem, under these conditions structures S, S ′ coincide on the
truth value of every formula φ that is strictly bounded by σ .
Lemma 1. Let σ be a simple situation term, S, S ′ , and v be as in the statement of Theorem 1 and suppose the conditions (1)–(5) are
satisﬁed. Let t be a term of any sort such that all its subterms of sort situation are preﬁxes of σ . Then, v S (t) = v S ′ (t).
Proof. If t is a variable, the lemma is obvious. Suppose that t is not a variable. Suppose that v S (t) = v S ′ (t). Then there must
be a subterm g(r1, . . . , rn) of t such that v S (ri) = v S ′ (ri), i = 1, . . . ,n, and gS(v S (r1), . . . , v S (rn)) = gS ′(v S ′ (r1), . . . , v S ′ (rn)).
If g is the function do, we get a contradiction by condition (2). If g is an action or a situation independent function, by
condition (3) we get a contradiction. Finally, if g is a functional ﬂuent symbol, then its last argument must be a preﬁx of σ .
Then by condition (5) we get a contradiction. 
Corollary 1. Let S, S ′ and v be as in Lemma 1 above, and let σ ′, σ be simple situation terms. Then
S, v | σ ′ = σ iff S ′, v | σ ′ = σ ; and
S, v | σ ′  σ iff S ′, v | σ ′  σ .
4 v(x) denotes v(x1), . . . , v(xn) where the xi ’s are the variables in x. v(xi) is the value assigned to xi by the variable assignment v .
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Proof of Theorem 1. Let the structures S, S ′ , variable assignment v , and formula φ be as described in the statement of the
theorem and suppose that the conditions (1)–(5) are satisﬁed.
The proof is by induction on the syntactic structure of φ. We have the following cases:
(1) Suppose φ is an atom of the form σ ′  σ or σ ′ = σ . Then by deﬁnition of strictly bounded formulas, all terms of sort
situation in σ ′ must be preﬁxes of σ and hence σ ′ is simple. The theorem then follows from Corollary 1.
(2) Suppose φ is an atom of the form t1 = t2 where t1, t2 are terms of sort action or object. As before, all terms of sort
situation in t1, t2 must be preﬁxes of σ . The theorem then follows from Lemma 1.
(3) Suppose φ is a situation independent relational atom P (t), where t are terms of sort action or object. Then all terms of
sort situation in t are preﬁxes of σ . The theorem then follows from Lemma 1 and condition (3).
(4) Suppose φ is a relational ﬂuent atom F (t, σ ′). Then all terms of sort situation in t , σ ′ are preﬁxes of σ . The theorem
then follows from Lemma 1 and condition (4).
(5) Suppose φ is a non-atomic formula of the form (∃s′: σ ′′  σ ′ = σ)W or (∃s′: σ ′′  σ ′  σ)W ,5 where W is a propo-
sitional combination of formulas each strictly bounded by σ ′ or by σ . Let vs be a variable assignment identical to v
except for mapping the variable s′ to element s of Sit . By deﬁnition of strictly bounded formulas, σ ′′ and σ ′ are simple
situation terms. Thus by Corollary 1, S, vs | σ ′′  σ ′ = σ iff S ′, vs | σ ′′  σ ′ = σ , for any s.
Suppose that S, v | (∃s′: σ ′′  σ ′ = σ). Then by the corollary, S ′, v | (∃s′: σ ′′  σ ′ = σ). It follows that S, v | φ
and S ′ , v | φ and thus the theorem holds.
Suppose that S, v | (∃s′: σ ′′  σ ′ = σ). Then by the corollary S ′, v | (∃s′: σ ′′  σ ′ = σ). By induction, for each
subformula W ′ of W that is strictly bounded by σ , we have S, v | W ′ iff S, v | W ′ . Similarly, by induction, for each
subformula W ′ of W that is strictly bounded by σ ′ , we have S, v | W ′ iff S, v | W ′ . It follows that the theorem holds.
(6) For non-atomic formulas of the form ¬φ, φ1 ∧ φ2, and (∃u)φ (see item (3) of Deﬁnition 9) the theorem follows by
induction on the structure of φ. 
An important property of Markovian basic action theories, called Relative Satisﬁability, says that if the initial database
DS0 together with a set Duna of unique names axioms for actions is satisﬁable, then adding the foundational axioms, Σ ,
and any set of action precondition and successor state axioms, results in a satisﬁable theory, provided the successor state
axioms for functional ﬂuents satisfy a consistency property (see Eq. (6) below).
We prove next that satisﬁability is also preserved after adding non-Markovian action precondition and successor state
axioms to a satisﬁable initial database with unique names axioms.
Theorem 2 (Relative satisﬁability). A Non-Markovian Basic Action Theory D is satisﬁable iff Duna ∪ DS0 is satisﬁable.
Proof. Starting from a model M0 of Duna ∪ DS0 , we construct a model M of D.
(1) Satisfying Σ :
Let Act and Obj be the domains for sorts action and object, respectively, in M0. We deﬁne a structure M by complete
induction.
(a) Let the same Act and Obj be the domains for sorts action and object in M . We deﬁne the domain Sit for sort situation
as the set of all ﬁnite sequences of elements of Act. That is, if {α1, . . . ,αn} ⊆ Act then [α1, . . . ,αn] ∈ Sit.
(b) Next deﬁne the interpretation of S0 and do in M as follows:
SM0 = [ ],
doM
(
α, [α1, . . . ,αn]
) = [α1, . . . ,αn,α],
where α ∈ Act and [α1, . . . ,αn] ∈ Sit.
(c) Deﬁne the interpretation of  to be σ M σ ′ whenever σ is a proper preﬁx of σ ′ .
It is easy to verify that M as deﬁned so far satisﬁes the foundational axioms Σ .
We continue by deﬁning the interpretation of all the predicates other than Poss, whose interpretation is deﬁned after-
ward, and  whose interpretation is already deﬁned. We will also deﬁne now the interpretation of all functions, except
for do whose interpretation is given above. The predicates and functions include ﬂuents, and so we need to provide an
interpretation with respect to all situations. This is where the use of a deﬁnition by complete induction is needed. We
use induction on the length of the sequences and complete induction is required as the successor state axioms may
refer to past situations. After giving such an interpretation, the only remaining step will be to deﬁne the interpretation
5 The proof is the same if the ﬁrst  is replaced with  or =.
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in their rhs (see Deﬁnition 10).
Let us proceed to deﬁne the interpretation under M of predicate and function symbols other than do, Poss, and .
(2) Interpretation of situation independent predicates and functions:
For situation independent predicates and functions, the sort situation and its domain Sit are irrelevant and the domains
Act and Obj are the same in M as in M0. Thus, let M interpret situation independent predicates and functions just as
they are in M0. It follows that since M0 satisﬁes Duna so does M .
(3) Interpretation of ﬂuents:
Let σ be a sequence in Sit and assume that for every variable assignment v that assigns σ to s, the following holds:
if M, v | s′  s then M, v interprets every relational ﬂuent F (x, s′) and assigns a value in Obj ∪ Act to every functional
ﬂuent f (x, s′).
(a) Interpretation of ﬂuents in the initial situation:
Suppose that σ is the empty sequence [ ]. Then SM0 = σ . Let F be a relational ﬂuent, f a functional ﬂuent and v0 a
variable assignment for variables of sorts object and action (for either structure since they share domains for these
sorts). Deﬁne M such that:
M, v0 | F (x, S0) iff M0, v0 | F (x, S0),
f M
(x[v0], SM0
) = f M0(x[v0], SM00
)
.
Recall that functional ﬂuents range over sorts action or object. They cannot range over sort situation. Also, all the
sentences in DS0 are uniform in S0. This and the fact that M0 satisﬁes DS0 implies that M is also a model of DS0 .
(b) Interpretation of ﬂuents in situations other than S0:
Suppose that σ is the sequence [α1, . . . ,αn], n 1.
Let F be a relational ﬂuent and let its successor state axiom be
F
(x,do(a, s)) ≡ ΦF (x,a, s).
For every variable assignment v assigning σ to s we have by induction that if M, v | s′  s then M, v interprets all
relational ﬂuents F (x, s′).
From Theorem 1, it follows that M, v must assign a value to ΦF (x,a, s), which is strictly bounded by s and does not
mention Poss. If M, v did not assign a value to this formula, then we could extend M so that it does assign a value
to it, and construct another extended model M ′ that assigns a different value to ΦF (x,a, s), which would contradict
the theorem.
Furthermore, since M satisﬁes the foundational axioms Σ , we have that M, v | s  do(a, s), which implies that
M, v | do(a, s)  s by the same axioms Σ . Thus M, v does not yet assign a value to F (x,do(a, s)).
We can then deﬁne M to interpret F (x,do(a, s)) as follows:
M, v | F (x,do(a, s)) iff M, v | ΦF (x,a, s).
The interpretation of functional ﬂuents in situation do(a, s) is deﬁned similarly. For each functional ﬂuent f with
successor state axiom
f
(x,do(a, s)) = y ≡ φ f (x, y,a, s)
and each variable assignment v assigning σ to s, deﬁne
M, v | f (x,do(a, s)) = y iff M, v | φF (x, y,a, s).
A similar argument to the one above shows that this is well deﬁned. Furthermore, the functional ﬂuent consistency
property which states that:
Duna ∪ DS0 | (∀a, s, x).(∃y)φ f (x, y,a, s) ∧
[(∀y, y′).φ f (x, y,a, s) ∧ φ f
(x, y′,a, s) ⊃ y = y′], (6)
together with the fact that M satisﬁes Duna ∪ DS0 , guarantee that one and only one value y is assigned to
f (x,do(a, s)) above.
This completes the inductive deﬁnition of how M interprets ﬂuents. By construction, M satisﬁes all successor state
axioms.
It remains to specify how M interprets Poss(a, s).
(4) Interpretation of Poss(a, s):
Consider an element α ∈ Act. There are two possible cases:
(a) There is a variable assignment v such that v assigns α to a and there is an action function A(x) such that M, v |
a = A(x).
By deﬁnition, Dap includes an axiom Poss(A(x), s) ≡ ΠA(x, s) and ΠA(x, s) does not mention predicate Poss. Hence,
M already assigns a value to ΠA(x, s). We specify that
M, v | Poss(A(x), s) iff M, v | ΠA(x, s).
Since M satisﬁes the unique names axioms for actions, the value assigned to Poss is unique.
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value assigned to Poss(a, s) will satisfy the action precondition axioms.
By construction, M satisﬁes all the action precondition and successor state axioms of D. This completes the proof of
relative satisﬁability. 
4. Regression of bounded formulas
The particular syntactic form of action precondition and successor state axioms is computationally advantageous. These
axioms are deﬁnitions: the right-hand side serves as the deﬁnition of the predicate on the left-hand side, and this makes
them exchangeable in a logically equivalent way. Reiter’s regression operator [5,21], R, exploits this property to provide a
specialized theorem proving mechanism for the Lsitcalc class of regressable formulas.
In this section, we make two generalizations:
• we deﬁne a strictly larger class of formulas that includes Reiter’s original class of regressable formulas;
• we deﬁne a generalized operator for regressing these formulas and prove that it is sound and complete.
The generalized class of regressable formulas is based on the notion of bounded formula deﬁned earlier. This will allow
us to apply regression with respect to Non-Markovian Action Theories. We remark, however, that even when the background
theory consists of standard Markovian axioms, the generalized operator is useful since it allows regressing many formulas
which are not regressable by the original operator. In particular, it will allow us to prove entailment of formulas that
mention the  relation, which is not possible with the original regression operator. We make further comments on this
below.
4.1. Regressable formulas
We start by generalizing the class of formulas on which the regression operator will be applicable.
Deﬁnition 13 (Regressable formulas). A formula W of Lsitcalc is regressable iff
(1) W is ﬁrst order; and
(2) W is bounded by a situation term rooted at S0 and has no free variables of sort situation; and
(3) for every atom of the form Poss(α,σ ) mentioned by W , α has the form A(t1, . . . , tn) for some n-ary action function
symbol A of Lsitcalc .
Example 5. The original deﬁnition of regressable formulas requires all terms of sort situation to be rooted at S0, does not
allow quantifying over situations, nor the mention of predicate , nor equality between situation terms.
The above deﬁnition of regressable formulas also includes, for example, the following: Suppose that σ is a ground
situation term, e.g., a database transaction log or a ground plan. We can use regression to answer queries such as:
• has block x always been on top of block y during (the execution of) σ ?
(∀s: s  σ)on(x, y, s);
• is there an action that would have resulted in block x being on top of block y ever during σ ?
(∃a)(∃s: s  σ)on(x, y,do(a, s));
• same as the previous query, but also requiring that the action actually be executable:
(∃a)(∃s: s  σ)Poss(a, s) ∧ on(x, y,do(a, s));
• was action shoot ever possible during σ and would it have killed the turkey?
(∃s: s  σ)Poss(shoot, s) ∧ dead(turkey,do(shoot, s)).
4.2. Generalized regression operator
Let us proceed to generalize Reiter’s regression operator R for the above class of formulas. We assume henceforth,
without loss of generality, that formulas have had their quantiﬁed variables renamed to be distinct from all free variables.
We use W |t1t2 to denote the formula obtained from W by replacing the term t1 with t2.
Deﬁnition 14 (Prime functional ﬂuent term). (See [21].) A functional ﬂuent term is prime iff it has the form f (t,do([α1, . . . ,αn],
S0)) for n 1 and each of the terms t , α1, . . . ,αn is uniform in S0.
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Remark 1. (See [21].) Let g(t,do(α,σ )) be an Lsitcalc term without free variables of sort situation, i.e., all its subterms of
sort situation are of the form do([α1, . . . ,αn], S0), n 0. Then g(t,do(α,σ )) mentions a prime functional ﬂuent term.
Deﬁnition 15 (Generalized regression operator). Let W be a regressable formula of Lsitcalc .
(1) If W is an atom, then by the deﬁnition of regressable it is bounded by a situation term rooted at S0 and from this and
the deﬁnition of bounded formulas, it follows that W must be uniformly rooted at S0. Reiter’s regression operator as
originally deﬁned6 works for these formulas. For completeness we deﬁne the operator here anyway. By virtue of being
regressable, the atom W must be of one of the following forms:
(a) An equality atom of the form
do
([
α′1, . . . ,α′m
]
, S0
) = do([α1, . . . ,αn], S0
)
.
If m = n = 0, R[W ] = true.
If m = n, R[W ] = false.
If m = n 1 then R[W ] = R[α′1 = α1 ∧ · · · ∧ α′m = αm].
(b) A -atom of the form
do
([
α′1, . . . ,α′m
]
, S0
) do([α1, . . . ,αn], S0).
If m = 0 and n 1, then R[W ] = true.
If m n, then R[W ] = false.
If 1m < n, then R[W ] = R[α′1 = α1 ∧ · · · ∧ α′m = αm].
(c) An atom Poss(α,σ ) where α and σ are terms of sort action and situation respectively. By deﬁnition of regress-
able formulas, the term α is of the form A(t), where A is an action function symbol with a corresponding action
precondition axiom Poss(A(x), s) ≡ ΠA(x, s) in Dap . Then,
R[W ] = R[ΠA(t,σ )
]
.
The remaining possible cases are the following:
(d) An atom whose only situation term is S0 or a situation independent atom.
Then R[W ] = W .
(e) An atom that mentions a functional ﬂuent term of the form
g
(t′,do(α′,σ ′)).
Since it is an atom bounded by a situation term rooted at S0, by deﬁnition of bounded it must be uniformly rooted
at S0. Hence, the atom does not mention any variables of sort situation and thus, by Remark 1, it must mention a
prime functional ﬂuent term f (t,do(α,σ )). This ﬂuent term is such that α is uniform in S0 and σ is rooted at S0.
Let f (x,do(a, s)) = y ≡ φ f (x, y,a, s) be this functional ﬂuent term’s successor state axiom in Dss . Then,
R[W ] = R[(∃v).φ f (t, v,α,σ ) ∧ W
∣∣ f (t,do(α,σ ))
v
]
,
where v is a fresh new variable.
(f) A relational ﬂuent atom F (t,do(α,σ )) that contains no functional ﬂuent terms.
Let F (x,do(a, s)) ≡ ΦF (x,a, s) be this ﬂuent’s successor state axiom in Dss .
Then R[W ] = R[ΦF (t,α,σ )].
(2) When W is a regressable formula of the form7 (∃s: σ ′  σ ′′  σ)W ′ or (∃s: σ ′  σ ′′ = σ)W ′ we have the following
subcases:
(a) Suppose W is a regressable formula of the form
(∃s: σ ′  do([α′1, . . . ,α′m], s) do([α1, . . . ,αn], S0))W ′,
where m 0.
If m n, then R[W ] = false.
If m < n, then
R[W ] = R[(∃s: σ ′  do([α′1, . . . ,α′m], s) = do([α1, . . . ,αn−1], S0))W ′]∨
R[(∃s: σ ′  do([α′1, . . . ,α′m], s) do([α1, . . . ,αn−1], S0))W ′].
6 We are referring to the deﬁnition of the regression operator as it appears in [21], which is slightly more general than the deﬁnition given in [2].
7 The deﬁnition of regression of the corresponding formulas with σ ′ = σ ′′ instead of σ ′  σ ′′ is deﬁned in the same way.
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(∃s: σ ′  do([α′1, . . . ,α′m], s) = do([α1, . . . ,αn], S0))W ′,
where m 1. By the same argument as in the previous case, σ ′ is rooted at S0.
If m > n, then R[W ] = false.
If m n, then
R[W ] = R[(∃s: S0  do
([
α′1, . . . ,α′m−1
]
, s
) = do([α1, . . . ,αn−1], S0
))
(
α′′m = αn
)∧ σ ′  do([α1, . . . ,αn], S0)∧ W ′],
where α′′m stands for α′m|sdo([α1,...,αn−m],S0) .8
(c) Suppose W is a regressable formula of the form
(∃s: σ ′  s = do([α1, . . . ,αn], S0))W ′.
By deﬁnition of bounded formulas, σ ′ does not mention the variable s. Moreover, quantiﬁers on situation variables
can only be introduced through the abbreviations (5). Hence, if σ ′ does mention a variable, then this variable must
be a free variable. This is not possible by deﬁnition of regressable, thus σ ′ must be rooted at S0.
The regression is then deﬁned as follows:
R[W ] = R[σ ′  do([α1, . . . ,αn], S0)∧ W ′∣∣sdo([α1,...,αn],S0)
]
.
(3) For the remaining possibilities, regression is deﬁned as follows:
R[¬W ] = ¬R[W ],
R[W1 ∧ W2] = R[W1] ∧ R[W2].
For a variable v of any sort other than situation:
R[(∃v)W ] = (∃v)R[W ].
Example 6. Consider a sentence G(s) saying that at some point in the past relative to s, doing action putdown(x), for some
block x, would have made action stack(A, B) possible:
G(s)
def= (∃s′: S0  s′  s
)
(∃x)Poss(stack(A, B),do(putdown(x), s′)).
Suppose that we want to determine whether G holds after executing the sequence [unstack(D, B), stack(D, A)], i.e., whether
D | G(do(stack(D, A),do(unstack(D, B), S0
)))
.
It is easy to check that G(do(stack(D, A),do(unstack(D, B), S0))) is regressable according to Deﬁnition 13. Applying re-
gression to this formula yields the following:
R[G(do(stack(D, A),do(unstack(D, B), S0
)))]
=
R[(∃s′: S0  s′  do
(
stack(D, A),do
(
unstack(D, B), S0
)))
(∃x)Poss(stack(A, B),do(putdown(x), s′))]
= (by Case 3)
R[(∃s′: S0  s′ = do
(
stack(D, A),do
(
unstack(D, B), S0
)))
(∃x)Poss(stack(A, B),do(putdown(x), s′))]∨
R[(∃s′: S0  s′  do(stack(D, A),do(unstack(D, B), S0)))
(∃x)Poss(stack(A, B),do(putdown(x), s′))]
= (by Cases 2c, 2a)
R[(∃x)Poss(stack(A, B),do([unstack(D, B), stack(D, A),putdown(x)], S0
))]
∨
R[(∃s′: s′ = do(unstack(D, B), S0
))
(∃x)Poss(stack(A, B),do(putdown(x), s′))]
∨
R[(∃s′: s′  do(unstack(D, B), S0))(∃x)Poss(stack(A, B),do(putdown(x), s′))]
8 Replacing s with do([α1, . . . ,αn−m], S0) is only necessary to comply with the deﬁnition of bounded formulas. In fact, the replacement would take place
in subsequent regression steps if it were not done here.
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R[(∃x)Poss(stack(A, B),do([unstack(D, B), stack(D, A),putdown(x)], S0
))]∨
R[(∃x)Poss(stack(A, B),do([unstack(D, B),putdown(x)], S0
))]∨
R[(∃s′: s′ = S0)(∃x)Poss
(
stack(A, B),do
(
putdown(x), s′
))]∨
R[(∃s′: s′  S0)(∃x)Poss(stack(A, B),do(putdown(x), s′))]
= (by Cases 2c, 2a)
R[(∃x)Poss(stack(A, B),do([unstack(D, B), stack(D, A),putdown(x)], S0
))]∨
R[(∃x)Poss(stack(A, B),do([unstack(D, B),putdown(x)], S0
))]∨
R[(∃x)Poss(stack(A, B),do(putdown(x), S0
))]
.
The remaining steps are the same as with Reiter’s original regression operator.
4.3. Correctness of regression
Our proof of correctness of operator R is based on the proof of correctness of the original regression operator [21]. The
main technical diﬃculty here is that with Non-Markovian Action Theories and the generalized regressable formulas, during
regression situation terms can grow “longer” before they start “shrinking” down to S0, which makes the induction a bit
more complicated.
Theorem 3. Suppose W is a regressable formula of Lsitcalc and D is a basic Non-Markovian Action Theory. Then,
(1) R[W ] is a formula uniform in S0 .
(2) D | (∀).W ≡ R[W ].
Proof. The proof is by induction based on an ordering relation ≺ on tuples of integers. We start by deﬁning this ordering.
Let Λ be the set of all countably inﬁnite sequences of natural numbers with a ﬁnite number of nonzero elements. Deﬁne
the binary relation ≺ on this set as the reverse lexicographic ordering:
(λ1, λ2, . . .) ≺
(
λ′1, λ′2, . . .
)
iff for some m, λm < λ
′
m, and for all n >m, λn = λ′n.
The set Λ satisﬁes well ordering. Next, overload ≺ by deﬁning the following lexicographic ordering on Λ ×N:
(λ,n) ≺ (λ′,n′) iff n < n′ or n = n′ and λ ≺ λ′.
Clearly, any subset of Λ × N has a minimal element and so ≺ provides a well-ordering on this set. It is worth remarking
that the ordering priority in tuple elements increases from left to right.
Before we deﬁne our mapping from Lsitcalc regressable formulas to tuples in Λ ×N we need the following notions.
If g(t1, . . . , tn) is an Lsitcalc term, then t1, . . . , tn are said to be proper subterms of g(t1, . . . , tn). An occurrence of a situation
term in an Lsitcalc formula W is said to be maximal iff its occurrence is not as a proper subterm of some situation term.
Intuitively, the occurrence of all terms do([α1, . . . ,αi], σ ), i = 0, . . . ,n − 1, in a term do([α1, . . . ,αn], σ ) are not maximal
since each is a proper subterm of do([α1, . . . ,αi+1], σ ).
For a regressable formula W , let L(W ) be the sum of the length of σ for each occurrence of σ in W such that:
• σ is a term of sort situation rooted at a situation variable;
• the occurrence of σ in W is maximal;
• if the occurrence is in a quantiﬁer expression (Q s: σ ′  σ ′′  σ), then its length is larger than the length of σ ′′ .
We are now ready to deﬁne the mapping. Deﬁne index(W ) to be:
index(W )
def= ((C, E, I, λ1, λ2, . . .), P
)
,
where
(1) C is the number of connectives and quantiﬁers,
(2) E is the number of equality atoms between situation terms,
(3) I is the number of -atoms,
(4) for m 1, λm is the number of maximal occurrences in W of situation terms of length m− L(W ) that are rooted at S0,
(5) P is the number of Poss atoms mentioned by W .
Notice that the λ’s here are “shifted” to the right a number L(W ) of places. In other words, if one maximal term of
length k occurs in W , then λk+L(W ) = 1. The reason behind this is that after a regression step on a formula with a situation
variable, it is possible that a situation term that mentions such a variable be replaced by a longer one. For instance, the
formula (∃s: s = do(A, S0))P (do(B, s)) which has λ1 = 0, λ1+1 = 1, would be regressed into P (do([A, B], S0)) which also has
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the same λ1 = 0, λ0+2 = 1. Thus the index of the ﬁrst formula would precede the index of the second one, which has been
regressed one step. With the shifted λ’s, the precedence in this case is decided based only on the number of connectives
and quantiﬁers.
Let us proceed with the proof. Consider a regressable formula W and assume the theorem for all regressable formulas
with index ≺ index(W ).
(1) Suppose that W is a regressable atom. Then W is an atom bounded by a situation term rooted at S0 and has no free
variables of sort situation. By deﬁnition of bounded formulas, W is uniformly rooted at S0. This implies that L(W ) = 0.
We have the following cases:
(a) Suppose that W is an equality atom of the form
do
([
α′1, . . . ,α′m
]
, S0
) = do([α1, . . . ,αn], S0
)
.
This atom is regressed into true if m = n = 0, false if m = n. Otherwise, we have that
R[W ] = R[α′1 = α1 ∧ · · · ∧ α′m = αm
]
.
In the former two cases, the theorem follows immediately. Consider the case where m = n 1 and let W ∗ stand for
α′1 = α1 ∧ · · · ∧ α′m = αm .
Since W is a regressable atom, it is bounded by a situation term rooted at S0, and therefore uniformly rooted at S0.
This implies that each α′i = αi is also uniformly rooted at S0 and hence that the conjunction W ∗ is uniformly rooted
at S0. Therefore W ∗ is bounded by a situation term rooted at S0 and thus regressable.
The index of W ∗ differs from the index of W in that λm is smaller by at least two in index(W ∗) while the num-
ber P and all other λi remain the same. For instance, if αi ’s and α′j ’s do not mention any situation terms, then
index(W ∗) = ((m,0,0,0, . . .),0) and index(W ) = ((0,1,0,0, . . . ,2,0, . . .),0).
Thus index(W ∗) ≺ index(W ). Hence, by the induction hypothesis, we have that R[W ] = R[W ∗] is uniform in S0.
Also from the induction hypothesis, we have that D | (∀)W ∗ ≡ R[W ∗]. Furthermore, it is easy to prove the follow-
ing entailment from the foundational axioms Σ :
Σ | (∀)W ≡ α′1 = α1 ∧ · · · ∧ α′m = αm.
Therefore we have that D | (∀).W ≡ W ∗ ≡ R[W ∗] = R[W ] as wanted.
(b) Suppose that W is a -atom of the form
do
([
α′1, . . . ,α′m
]
, S0
) do([α1, . . . ,αn], S0).
When m = 0 and n  1, R[W ] = true; and when m  n R[W ] = false. In both of these cases the theorem follows
immediately from Σ | (∀)W ≡ true (false, respectively).
In the remaining case, when 1m < n, we have that
R[W ] = R[α′1 = α1 ∧ · · · ∧ α′m = αm
]
.
Let W ∗ stand for α′1 = α1 ∧ · · · ∧ α′m = αm . The proof proceeds in a similar way as in the case of equality atoms
above. By the same argument as in the equality case, W ∗ is regressable. The index(W ∗) differs from index(W )
in that λm and λn decrease by at least one in index(W ∗). Other λ values remain the same and the number of
Poss-atoms, P , is zero in both cases. The number of -atoms, I , is also smaller by one in index(W ∗). The number
of connectives, C , increases but, being the leftmost element, it has the lowest priority. Clearly, then, index(W ∗) ≺
index(W ). Furthermore, it is easy to prove the entailment:
Σ | (∀).do([α′1, . . . ,α′m
]
, S0
) do([α1, . . . ,αn], S0) ≡ W ∗.
As in the previous case, we have by induction that D | (∀).W ∗ ≡ R[W ∗] = R[W ], and ﬁnally the theorem follows
from this and the above entailment.
(c) Suppose W is a regressable atom of the form Poss(α,σ ) for terms α and σ of sorts action and situation respectively.
Then α must be of the form A(t) and there must be a corresponding action precondition axiom Poss(A(x), s) ≡
ΠA(x, s) in D. After suitably renaming variables if necessary, we have that
D | (∀).W ≡ ΠA(t,σ ). (7)
By deﬁnition, ΠA(x, s) does not mention predicate Poss. Therefore, index(ΠA(t, σ )) ≺ index(W ). (Recall that in the
deﬁnition of index(W ), the number P of Poss-atoms is the rightmost element, and the ordering priority increases
from left to right.)
Moreover, since Poss(A(t),σ ) is a regressable atom, σ and all terms of sort situation mentioned by t must be rooted
at S0. From this and the fact that ΠA(x, s) is by deﬁnition bounded by a situation term rooted at s, it follows that
ΠA(t, σ ) is regressable. Therefore, by induction, R[ΠA(t, σ )] is uniform in S0 and
D | (∀).ΠA(t,σ ) ≡ R
[
ΠA(t,σ )
]
. (8)
By deﬁnition, R[W ] = R[ΠA(t, σ )]. The theorem follows from this, (7) and (8).
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(i) Suppose W is an atom that does not mention any terms of sort situation or whose only term of this sort is S0.
Then W is uniform in S0. Hence R[W ] = W by deﬁnition of regression and the theorem is immediate. Note
that for such a W , index(W ) = ((0, . . .),0).
(ii) Suppose W is an atom that mentions a functional ﬂuent term. Since W is regressable, it has no free variables
of sort situation and hence, by Remark 1, it mentions a prime functional ﬂuent term f (t,do(α,σ )). Let the
successor state axiom corresponding to this ﬂuent be:
f
(x,do(a, s)) = y ≡ φ f (x, y,a, s).
Assuming suitable variable renaming, it is easy to see that
D | (∀).W ≡ (∃y).φ f (t, y,α,σ ) ∧ W
∣∣ f (t,do(α,σ ))
y . (9)
Let W ∗ denote the rhs of the above equivalence. Let us show that W ∗ is regressable and that index(W ∗) ≺
index(W ). First, since W is an atom and it is bounded by a situation term rooted at S0, then σ must be rooted
at S0. Since, by deﬁnition of successor state axioms, φ f (x, y,a, s) is bounded by s, W ∗ is bounded by a situation
term rooted at S0 and hence is regressable.
Second, φ f (x, y,a, s) does not mention the predicate Poss, so the number of Poss-atoms P is zero for both
W and W ∗ . Further, since f (t,do(α,σ )) is a prime functional ﬂuent term (see Deﬁnition 14), the only term
of sort situation mentioned by t,α is S0. Thus replacing f (t,do(α,σ )) in W does not change any of the λ
values except for λk+1+L(W ) , where k + 1 is the length of do(α,σ ), which decreases. By deﬁnition of successor
state axioms, φ f (x, y,a, s) is strictly bounded by s and does not mention the constant S0. Then all terms of
sort situation mentioned by φ f (t, y,α,σ ) which are different from σ are rooted at a situation variable. This
means that the conjunct (∃y).φ f (t, y,α,σ ) contributes only to one λ value, namely to λk+L(W ) , which has
lower ordering priority than λk+1+L(W ) . Therefore, index(W ∗) ≺ index(W ).
As an example, consider the atom f (do(B,do(A, S0))) = c and a successor state axiom
f
(
do(a, s)
) = y ≡ (∃s′: s′  s)P(y, s′).
In the case of this W ,
index(W ) = ((0,0,0,0, . . . , λ1 = 0, λ2 = 1,0, . . .),0
)
and for W ∗ = (∃s′: s′  do(A, S0))P (y, s′) we have
index
(
W ∗
) = ((1,0,1,0, . . . , λ1 = 1, λ2 = 0,0, . . .),0
)
.
Thus index(W ∗) ≺ index(W ).
By induction, then, R[W ∗] is uniform in S0 and D | (∀).W ∗ ≡ R[W ∗]. The theorem follows from this, R[W ] =
R[W ∗], and (9).
(iii) Suppose otherwise that W is a relational ﬂuent atom of the form F (t,do(α,σ )). Let the successor state axiom
corresponding to this ﬂuent be:
F
(x,do(a, s)) ≡ ΦF (x,a, s).
Assuming suitable variable renaming as before, we have that
D | (∀).W ≡ ΦF (t,α,σ ). (10)
Let W ∗ denote the rhs of the above equivalence. We need to show that W ∗ is regressable and that index(W ∗) ≺
index(W ).
Since F (t,do(α,σ )) is regressable, σ and all the terms of sort situation mentioned by t and α must be rooted
at S0. Since, by deﬁnition, ΦF (x,a, s) is bounded by s, ΦF (t,α,σ ) is bounded by σ , which is rooted at S0, and
therefore regressable.
Now, by deﬁnition, ΦF (x,a, s) does not mention the predicate Poss nor constant S0. Since F (t,do(α,σ )) is
a regressable atom, all subterms of sort situation of t,α and σ are uniformly rooted at S0. Moreover, since
ΦF (x,a, s) is strictly bounded by s, it follows that all terms of sort situation mentioned by ΦF (t,α,σ ) either
appear in t,α and σ or are rooted at a situation variable. Therefore, index(W ∗) ≺ index(W ).
As an example, consider the atom
F
(
g
(
do(C, S0)
)
,do
(
B,do(A, S0)
))
and the successor state axiom F (x,do(a, s)) ≡ P (x, s).
In the case of this W ,
index(W ) = ((0,0,0, λ1 = 1, λ2 = 1,0, . . .),0
)
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index
(
W ∗
) = ((0,0,0, λ1 = 2, λ2 = 0,0, . . .),0
)
.
By induction, R[W ∗] is uniform in S0 and D | (∀).W ∗ ≡ R[W ∗]. The theorem follows from this, R[W ] =
R[W ∗], and (10).
(2) When W is a regressable non-atomic formula, we have the following possible cases:
(a) Suppose W is a regressable formula of the form
(∃s: σ ′  do([α′1, . . . ,α′m], s) do([α1, . . . ,αn], S0))W ′.
If m n, then R[W ] = false. Then the theorem follows immediately from D | W ≡ false.
If m < n, the it is easy to prove that
D | (∀).W ≡ W1 ∨ W2, (11)
where
W1
def= (∃s: σ ′  do([α′1, . . . ,α′m], s) = do([α1, . . . ,αn−1], S0))W ′, (12)
W2
def= (∃s: σ ′  do([α′1, . . . ,α′m], s) do([α1, . . . ,αn−1], S0))W ′. (13)
Clearly, both W1 and W2 are regressable. It is also clear that L(W ) = L(W1) = L(W2). Since λn+L(W ) is smaller in
index(W1) and index(W2) than in index(W ) and the values λi , i > n + L(W ), are identical as is the number of Poss
atoms, we have that index(W1) ≺ index(W ) and similarly index(W2) ≺ index(W ).
By the induction hypothesis R[W1] and R[W2] are both uniform in S0, D | (∀).R[W1] ≡ W1, and D |
(∀).R[W2] ≡ W2. The theorem follows from this, R[W ] = R[W1] ∨ R[W2] and (11).
(b) Suppose W is a regressable formula of the form
(∃s: σ ′  s = do([α1, . . . ,αn], S0))W ′.
It is easy to see that, after suitable variable renaming,
D | (∀).W ≡ σ ′  do([α1, . . . ,αn], S0)∧ W ′∣∣sdo([α1,...,αn],S0). (14)
Let W ∗ stand for the rhs of the above equivalence. By deﬁnition of regression, R[W ] = R[W ∗]. As we show in
item (2) of Deﬁnition 15, σ ′ must be rooted at S0. Moreover, since W ′ is a propositional combination of formulas
each bounded by a situation term rooted at S0 or at s, then W ′|sdo([α1,...,αn],S0) is bounded by a situation term rooted
at S0. Therefore, W ∗ is regressable.
Let us show that index(W ∗) ≺ index(W ). Clearly W ∗ contains the same number P of Poss atoms as W . Let us show
that the λ values are the same for both formulas. Consider a maximal term do( α1, s) from W ′ and let m be its
length. Let do( α2, S0) stand for do([α1, . . . ,αn], S0) and W ′′ for W ′|do(α1,s)do(α1,do(α2,S0)) . Note that n + L(W ) is the index
of the value λ that accounts for term do( α2, S0) in index(W ) and n + m + L(W ′′) the index of the value λ that
accounts for do( α1,do( α2, S0)). Also, since L(W ′′) = L(W ) −m, n + L(W ) = n +m + L(W ′′). This implies that after
the substitution that results in W ′′ the λ’s are the same. Since this is true after the substitution of any term rooted
at s, index(W ) and index(W ∗) have the same λ’s.
From the above argument it follows that index(W ∗) differs from index(W ) only in the number of equality atoms, E ,
which is smaller in index(W ∗). Therefore, index(W ∗) ≺ index(W ).
Then, by induction, R[W ∗] is uniform in S0 and D | (∀).W ∗ ≡ R[W ∗]. The theorem follows from this, R[W ] =
R[W ∗], and (14).
(c) Suppose W is a regressable formula of the form
(∃s: σ ′  do([α′1, . . . ,α′m], s) = do([α1, . . . ,αn], S0))W ′,
where m > 1 (otherwise we are in the previous case).
If m > n, R[W ] = false by deﬁnition and, clearly, D | W ≡ false. The theorem then is immediate.
For m n, it is easy to prove that
D | (∀).W ≡ (∃s: do([α′1, . . . ,α′m−1
]
, s
) = do([α1, . . . ,αn−1], S0
))
(
α′′m = αn
)∧ σ ′  do([α1, . . . ,αn], S0)∧ W ′, (15)
where α′′m stands for α′m|sdo([α1,...,αn−m],S0) .
Let W ∗ denote this formula. By deﬁnition of regression, R[W ] = R[W ∗].
Let us show that W ∗ is regressable. For the same reason as in the previous case, σ ′ is rooted at S0, and thus the
conjunct σ ′  do([α1, . . . ,αn], S0) is uniformly rooted at S0. Since W is bounded by a situation term rooted at S0,
do([α′ , . . . ,α′m], s) must be rooted at s. This means that all the terms of sort situation mentioned by the α′′m are1
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combination of formulas each bounded by a situation term rooted at S0 or at s. Hence formula (15) is bounded by
a situation term rooted at S0 and therefore regressable.
Consider next the index of W ∗ . Clearly, the number of Poss atoms is the same in W and W ∗ . Based on L(W ∗),
there are two possible cases:
• Suppose that all the terms of sort situation mentioned by α′m are of length smaller than m. Then, by deﬁnition of
L(W ), the lengths of the terms in α′m are not included in L(W ). This implies that L(W ∗) = L(W ). Let σ be any
such term in α′m and let m − k, m  k > 0, be its length. Then the corresponding term σ |sdo([α1,...,αn−m],S0) in α′′m
has length n−m+m− k = n− k.
We thus have that n+ L(W ) = n+ L(W ∗) > n−k+ L(W ) = n−k+ L(W ∗) and that λn+L(W ) is smaller in index(W ∗)
(by one) than in index(W ). All λi , i > n+ L(W ), are equal for either formula. Therefore, index(W ∗) ≺ index(W ).
• Suppose that α′m mentions terms of sort situation of length at least m. For simplicity, assume there is only one
such term, σ , and let its length be m+k, k 0. Then, by deﬁnition of L(W ), the length of σ was included in L(W ).
Hence L(W ∗) = L(W )−m−k. The corresponding term σ |sdo([α1,...,αn−m],S0) in α′′m has length n−m+m+k = n+k.
We thus have that n+k+ L(W ∗) = n+k+ L(W )−m−k = n−m+ L(W ). Then, λn−m+L(W ) is larger in index(W ∗)
but λn+L(W ) is smaller. Since n > n −m and L(W ) > L(W ∗) all λi , i > n + L(W ) are equal for either formula. It
follows that index(W ∗) ≺ index(W ).
Therefore, by induction, R[W ∗] is uniform in S0 and D | (∀).W ∗ ≡ R[W ∗]. The theorem follows from this,
R[W ] = R[W ∗], and (15).
(3) The cases when W is a regressable formula of the forms ¬W1, W1 ∧ W2 and (∃v)W1 are straightforward. 
Soundness and completeness of the regression operator R follows from Theorems 2 and 3:
Theorem 4. Suppose W is a regressable sentence of Lsitcalc and D is a basic non-Markovian theory of actions:
D | W iff DS0 ∪ Duna | R[W ].
As is the case with Markovian theories, this theorem is computationally very important. It tells us that, for the class
of regressable formulas, we can prove that a Basic Action Theory entails a formula by ﬁrst applying regression, a purely
syntactic procedure, and then proving that the initial database plus unique names axioms entail the regressed formula. In
particular, it tells us that for the second part, proving entailment of the regressed formula, the only second order axiom in
the Basic Action Theory, i.e. the induction axiom, is no longer relevant.
5. Implementation
In this section we present an implementation in Prolog of a bounded formula evaluator. The evaluator is of course based
on regression, but instead of computing a regressed formula uniform in S0, it actually evaluates it against a background
action theory and initial (Prolog) database and returns the answer.
Bounded formulas are encoded as Prolog terms of the following forms:
somes(sit-var, lower-bnd, upper-bnd, W)
alls(sit-var, lower-bnd, upper-bnd, W)
corresponding to formulas of the form (∃s1: s′ ∼ s1 ∼ s)W and (∀s1: s′ ∼ s1 ∼ s)W , respectively. The ﬁrst argument
sit-var is the quantiﬁed variable of sort situation, s1. The arguments lower-bnd and upper-bnd correspond to s′ ∼ s1
and s1 ∼ s, respectively, where ∼ stands for either of =, , or . The third argument is the subformula W .
Bounded Formula Regression Evaluator
%%%%% (Case 1) %%%%%
%% Equality between situations and <-atoms
regr(s0 =$= s0).
regr(do(A,S) =$= do(A,S)).
regr(S1 << do(_,S)):- regr(S1 =$= S) ; regr(S1 << S).
regr(S1 <<= S):- regr(S1 =$= S) ; regr(S1 << S).
%% Poss, fluent, and situation independent atoms
regr(W):- isAtomEx(W), W.
%% case Sv is already a Prolog variable
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var(Sv), !, Sv=S2,
regr(S1 =$= S2 & W).
regr(somes(Sv,S1 << Sv, Sv =$= S2,W)):-
var(Sv), !, Sv=S2,
regr(S1 << S2 & W).
regr(somes(Sv,S1 <<= Sv, Sv =$= S2,W)):-
var(Sv), !, Sv=S2,
regr(S1 <<= S2 & W).
%%%%% (Case 2) %%%%%
% (2a)
regr(somes(Sv,LBound,Sm <<= Sn,W)):- !,
(regr(somes(Sv,LBound, Sm =$= Sn,W)) -> true ;
regr(somes(Sv,LBound, Sm << Sn,W))).
regr(somes(Sv,LBound,Sm << do(_,Sn),W)):- !,
(regr(somes(Sv,LBound, Sm =$= Sn,W)) -> true ;
regr(somes(Sv,LBound, Sm << Sn,W)) ).
%% (2b)
regr(somes(Sv, S1 =$= do(A,S), do(A,S) =$= do(A,S2),W)):- !,
regr(somes(Sv,s0 <<= S, S =$= S2, (S1 =$= do(A,S2)) & W)).
regr(somes(Sv,S1 << do(A,S), do(A,S) =$= do(A,S2),W)):- !,
regr(somes(Sv,s0 <<= S, S =$= S2, (S1 << do(A,S2)) & W)).
regr(somes(Sv,S1 <<= do(A,S), do(A,S) =$= do(A,S2),W)):- !,
regr(somes(Sv,s0 <<= S, S =$= S2, (S1 <<= do(A,S2)) & W)).
%% (2c)
% Sv is a constant representing a sitcalc variable
regr(somes(Sv,S1 =$= Sv, Sv =$= S2,W)):-
sub(Sv,SNew,W,W1) ,
SNew = S2,
regr(S1 =$= S2 & W1).
regr(somes(Sv,S1 << Sv, Sv =$= S2,W)):-
sub(Sv,SNew,W,W1),
SNew = S2,
regr(S1 << S2 & W1).
regr(somes(Sv,S1 <<= Sv, Sv =$= S2,W)):-
sub(Sv,SNew,W,W1),
SNew = S2,
regr(S1 <<= S2 & W1).
%% (Case 3)
regr(-(S1 =$= S)):- not regr(S1 =$= S).
regr(-(S1 << S)):- not regr(S1 << S).
regr(- somes(Sv,LBound, UBound,W)):- not regr(somes(Sv,LBound,UBound,W)).
regr(alls(Sv,LBound, UBound, W)):- regr(-somes(Sv,LBound,UBound,-W)).
regr(-alls(Sv,LBound, UBound, W)):- regr(somes(Sv,LBound,UBound,-W)).
regr(P & Q):- regr(P), regr(Q).
regr(P v Q):- regr(P) -> true ; regr(Q).
regr(P => Q):- regr(P) -> regr(Q) ; true.
regr(P <=> Q):- regr((P => Q) & (Q => P)).
regr(-(-P)):- regr(P).
regr(-(P & Q)):- regr(-P v -Q).
regr(-(P v Q)):- regr(-P & -Q).
regr(-(P => Q)):- regr(-(-P v Q)).
regr(-(P <=> Q)):- regr(-((P => Q) & (Q => P))).
regr(-all(V,W)):- regr(some(V,-W)).
regr(-some(V,W)):- not regr(some(V,W)).
regr(-W):- isAtomEx(W), not regr(W).
regr(all(V,W)):- regr(-some(V,-W)).
regr(some(V,W)):- sub(V,_,W,W1), regr(W1).
%% extended atom definition
isAtomEx(A) :- not (A = -W ; A = (W1 & W2) ; A = (W1 => W2) ;
A = (W1 <=> W2) ; A = (W1 v W2) ; A = some(X,W) ; A = all(X,W) ;
A = (S1 <<= S2) ; A = (S1 << S2) ; A = (S1 =$= S2) ;
A = somes(_,_,_,_) ; A = alls(_,_,_,_) ).
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Blocks World Basic Action Theory
poss(pickup(X),S):- clear(X,S), ontable(X,S), handempty(S).
poss(putdown(X),S):- holding(X,S).
poss(stack(X,Y),S):- holding(X,S), clear(Y,S).
poss(unstack(X,Y),S):- handempty(S), clear(X,S), on(X,Y,S).
clear(X,do(A,S)):- A=putdown(X) ; A=stack(X,Y) ; A=unstack(Y,X) ;
clear(X,S), not A=pickup(X),
not ( A=stack(Y,X) ; A=unstack(X,Y) ).
on(X,Y,do(A,S)):- A=stack(X,Y) ;
on(X,Y,S), not A=unstack(X,Y).
ontable(X,do(A,S)):- A=putdown(X) ;
ontable(X,S) , not A=pickup(X).
handempty(do(A,S)):- A=putdown(X) ;
A=stack(X,Y) ;
handempty(S), not A=pickup(X), not A=unstack(X,Y).
holding(X,do(A,S)):- A=pickup(X) ; A=unstack(X,Y) ;
holding(X,S), not A=putdown(X), not A=stack(X,Y).
% Primitive actions
primitive_action(pickup(X)). primitive_action(putdown(X)).
primitive_action(stack(X,Y)). primitive_action(unstack(X,Y)).
% Restore atoms.
restoreSitArg(clear(X),S,clear(X,S)). restoreSitArg(on(X,Y),S,on(X,Y,S)).
restoreSitArg(ontable(X),S,ontable(X,S)). restoreSitArg(handempty,S,handempty(S)).
restoreSitArg(holding(X),S,holding(X,S)).
% Initial Situation
on(d,b,s0). on(a,c,s0).
clear(d,s0). clear(a,s0).
ontable(b,s0). ontable(c,s0).
handempty(s0).
block(a). block(b). block(c). block(d).
Consider the following query:
(∃s1: S0  s1  do([unstack(D, B), stack(D, A)], S0))
(∃x, y)(∀a2)
(∀s2: S0  do(a2, s2) 
do
([
putdown(y),unstack(A, x), stack(A, B)
]
, s1
))
Poss(a2, s2)
This query says: is there any situation s1 in history
do
([
unstack(D, B), stack(D, A)
]
, S0
)
after S0, such that the sequence
do
([
putdown(y),unstack(A, x), stack(A, B)
]
, s1
)
is “legal” (i.e. all actions in it are executable) for some blocks x, y?
Intuitively, the only chance for executing this sequence is after unstack(D, B) but before stack(D, A). That means block y
must be D and x must be C . Any other sequence is impossible. We obtain the following results with the implementation.
A sample query
[eclipse 2]: regr(somes(s1,s0<<s1,s1<<=do(stack(d,a),do(unstack(d,b),s0)),
some(x, some(y,
all(act2,
alls(s2,s0<<do(act2,s2),
do(act2,s2)<<=do(stack(a,b),do(unstack(a,x),do(putdown(y),s1))),
poss(act2,s2) )))))).
Yes (0.00s cpu)
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[eclipse 3]: regr(somes(s1,do(unstack(d,b),s0)<<s1,s1<<=do(stack(d,a),do(unstack(d,b),s0)),
some(x, some(y,
all(act2,
alls(s2,s0<<do(act2,s2),
do(act2,s2)<<=do(stack(a,b),do(unstack(a,x),do(putdown(y),s1))),
poss(act2,s2) )))))).
No (0.00s cpu)
%%% Using variables and predicate block(_) to get actual blocks
[eclipse 5]: regr(somes(S1,s0<<S1,S1<<=do(stack(d,a),do(unstack(d,b),s0)),
some(X, some(Y, block(X) & block(Y) &
all(act2,
alls(s2,s0<<do(act2,s2),
do(act2,s2)<<=do(stack(a,b),do(unstack(a,X),do(putdown(Y),S1))),
poss(act2,s2) )))))).
X = c
Y = d
S1 = do(unstack(d,b),s0)
Yes (0.01s cpu)
As an illustration of an action theory with non-Markovian features, consider modifying the action precondition axiom of
stack(x, y) to include the condition that on(x, y) must not have held in the past unless it holds since the initial situation.
This condition is a form of planning search control that prevents repeating stack actions:
Poss
(
stack(x, y), s
) ≡ holding(x, s) ∧ clear(y, s)∧
¬(∃s1: s1  s)(on(x, y, s1) ∧ (∃s2: s2  s1)¬on(x, y, s2)).
The corresponding, modiﬁed Prolog rule would be
poss(stack(X,Y),S):- holding(X,S), clear(Y,S),
regr( -somes(s1, s0<<=s1, s1<<=S, on(X,Y,s1) &
somes(s2, s0<<=s2, s2<<s1, -on(X,Y,s2)))).
Here we use evaluator regr to handle the bounded formula. In general, a better option would perhaps be to reify all
the ﬂuent formulas and refer to them through the holds predicate. We refrain from doing that here though.
The following are the results obtained with two simple queries and the blocks world theory with the modiﬁed precon-
dition axiom:
Simple query with Non-Markovian APA
%% This is possible because on(a,c) holds only in s0.
[eclipse 2]: poss(stack(a,c),do(unstack(a,c),s0)).
Yes (0.00s cpu)
[eclipse 3]: poss(stack(a,d),do(unstack(a,d),do(stack(a,d),do(unstack(a,c),s0)))).
No (0.00s cpu)
6. Conclusion
We have presented a generalization of Reiter’s Basic Action Theories [5,21] where the Markov property is not assumed,
hence allowing representing and reasoning with non-Markovian systems. The main challenge in doing this is to develop
a framework that still supports regression as a computational device. We have identiﬁed a syntactically restricted class of
formulas, which we have called bounded, to which regression can be applied and that form the basis of our generalization
of Basic Action Theories for non-Markovian control. We have then generalized Reiter’s regression operator, R, to handle
the extended class of regressable formulas. The modiﬁed operator, as the original, can be used to compute entailment of
regressable formulas with respect to a background action theory. This problem intuitively consists in reducing the task of
proving the entailment of the original formula into the task of proving entailment of the regressed formula with respect to
the initial ﬁrst-order database plus the unique names axioms for actions. This is especially important because it makes the
only second-order axiom in these theories irrelevant with respect to solving this problem. Finally, we have proved that the
generalized regression operator is correct and shown a simple Prolog implementation of a formula evaluator based on this
operator.
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and language is possible thanks to the fact that histories are ﬁrst class objects in these theories. Considerably more effort
would have been required to remove this assumption from other formalizations where this is not the case.
Some recent work has considered non-Markovian features of domains described in A type languages [22]. In [23],
Giunchiglia and Lifschitz are concerned with problems where actions have ramiﬁcations, i.e., indirect effects. In particular,
they are concerned with ramiﬁcations due to ﬂuents whose truth value depends on that of other ﬂuents, but where this
dependency is unknown or implicit. In this case, knowledge about past states may be useful to determine the value of
ﬂuents with an implicit dependency on others, so their framework is non-Markovian to some degree. Although their for-
malism does not allow one to explicitly write non-Markovian deﬁnitions for ﬂuents, the problem they are concerned with
also serves as a motivation for a formalism that can handle non-Markovian systems.
Mendez et al. [24] essentially consider the same problem we do here: reasoning about actions whose dynamics depends
on past states. They extend the language A with the Past Linear Temporal logic connectives previous and since. This language
is propositional and so there is no quantifying into temporal modalities. More recently, Gonzalez et al. [25] introduced
an A-like language for modeling non-Markovian domains. One of their motivations is the practical problem of modeling
multimedia presentations that involve temporal conditions constraining how a presentation evolves. Similar to the language
in [24], this language does not allow quantifying into temporal modalities since it is also propositional. Computation in this
language is done through a translation into logic programming with answer set semantics [26] and systems such as Smodels
[27] and DLV [28]. Answer sets of a domain description contain every state (set of literals) the system goes through for a
given set of action occurrences, which may be disadvantageous in large domains. In Non-Markovian Action Theories, all the
reasoning is done in terms of a sequence of actions and the initial database, hence the size of the domain does not have as
big an impact.
An important question that we have not addressed in this paper is whether Non-Markovian Action Theories are more
expressive than standard action theories. In [13] we introduced a procedure for compiling the class of non-Markovian
theories that refer to past situations only through Past LTL-like formulas as in Example 2. In [29] we give a procedure
for a much larger class of action theories, and conjecture that the transformation can be extended to the general case.
In developing this transformation for a larger class of formulas, we gain the insight that a transformation for the general
case would likely have to essentially produce formulas and axioms that “simulate” the steps of the generalized regression
procedure. In this case, it seems more reasonable and practical simply to use the generalized regression operator on the
Non-Markovian Action Theories instead of applying a transformation.
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